さすがに昨日は往復800km超のドライブ運転の疲労が沸きだしてきて、連載記事ひと呼吸。本日は復帰。
　この元寇がもたらした状況の中で、今日社会とも通底していると感じるのは「政治と宗教」の関係性。この元寇の時期、鎌倉新宗教として日蓮が活動して布教を広げていた。政治と宗教という意味合いでは、そもそも仏教を日本社会に持ち込んできたのは飛鳥時代の聖徳太子であり蘇我氏勢力だったことからあきらかではある。政治という権力争奪においては、つねに「イデオロギー」が重要な領域を占めていて、いわば「正統性」争いである部分の最重要パーツであり、また「本質」に深く関わるものであった。
　その宗教活動において民衆への布教を基礎にしながら、政治権力に対して意見を申し立てる、というような動きにまで高まってきたのがこの日蓮による「立正安国論」の提起だったのだろう。そして書物というメディアによって広範な拡散を行って影響力の拡大を図ったという意味では、ひとつの象徴的動きだったのかも知れない。いわば「世論喚起」。
　立正安国論の要旨は以下の通り。「日蓮が鎌倉幕府の執権・北条時頼に提出した書で、国土の安泰と民衆の幸福は、正法である法華経を信仰することで実現されると説いています。具体的には、当時の天災地変や飢饉、疫病の原因は、人々が邪法を信じているからであり、それを改めなければ、内乱や他国からの侵略が起こると警告している。〜Wiki」
　飢饉や疫病、そして内乱は鎌倉期を通して頻発していたし、そこに元寇という「侵略」も加わったことから、その意見具申に強いリアリティが加わった。直接的な政治への異議申し立てだけれど、一方で他宗派への「内ゲバ」的な動きでもあったので、既成仏教宗派側からの反撃も大きく、日蓮は複数回、島流しという弾圧を受けた。しかしそのことがまた「法難」的に受け止められて民の側の心情的応援を喚起して宗派の勢力拡大につながっていったとも思える。
　政治と宗教、言論活動のわかりやすい嚆矢として日本社会が初めて経験したようなことがらと思われる。こうした動きが今日社会のある意味「起点」になっているのかも知れない。元寇を掘り起こすということは、そのような意味で、自分自身のアタマの上のこぶを見定めるような難しさがそこにあるのではないだろうか。このことが、科学的立場から歴史事実の解明分析を積極的に行う上で微妙に制御させているのかも知れない。元寇史料館が「日蓮聖人銅像護持教会」によって委託運営されていることも、そのような流れの中で考えると興味深い。

English version⬇

Rissho Ankoku-ron, Direct Involvement of Religion in Politics Genko-historikan-9]
Openly expressing one’s opinion on political power. A movement that seeks to arouse public opinion and use that groundswell to realise its own claims. It overlaps deeply with today’s society. …

　As expected, fatigue from driving over 800 km round-trip yesterday started to boil over, so we took a break from serial articles. Today I am back.
　In the situation brought about by the Genko Incident, the relationship between politics and religion is something that I feel has a common thread with today’s society. During this period of the Genko, Nichiren Buddhism was active as a new religion in Kamakura, spreading its teachings. In terms of politics and religion, it is clear that it was Prince Shotoku and the Soga clan forces in the Asuka period who brought Buddhism into Japanese society in the first place. In the struggle for power in politics, “ideology” always occupied an important area and was the most important part of the struggle for “legitimacy”, so to speak, and was deeply related to the “essence”.
　Nichiren’s Rissho Ankoku-ron, which was based on the propagation of his religious activities to the people, was probably what led to the rise of the movement to express opinions on political power. It may have been a symbolic movement in the sense that it spread widely through the media of books and sought to expand its influence. In other words, it was a “public opinion arousal”.
　The gist of the Rissho Ankoku-ron is as follows. ‘The Rissho Ankoku-ron was submitted by Nichiren to the regent of the Kamakura Shogunate, Hojo Tokiyori, and it taught that the peace of the land and the happiness of the people could be realised through faith in the Lotus Sutra, the true law of the land. Specifically, it warned that the natural disasters, famines and epidemics of the time were caused by people’s belief in the evil Dharma, and that if this was not changed, civil war and invasions from other countries would occur. ~Wiki”
Famine, pestilence and civil war were frequent throughout the Kamakura period, and the “invasion” of the Genko added to this, adding a strong sense of reality to this statement of opinion. Although it was a direct challenge to politics, it was also an ‘internal rebellion’ against other Buddhist sects, so the established Buddhist sects fought back and Nichiren Shoshu was repressed several times by being exiled to the islands. However, this was also perceived as a “legal calamity” and aroused emotional support from the people, leading to the expansion of the sect’s power.
　It is thought that this was the first time Japanese society experienced something like this, as a clear pioneering example of politics, religion and public discourse. These movements may be in a sense the “starting point” of today’s society. In this sense, digging up the Genko is like finding a bump on one’s own head. This may be a subtle control in actively clarifying and analysing historical facts from a scientific standpoint. It is interesting to note in this context that the Genko Historical Museum is operated on commission by the Church for the Protection of the Bronze Statue of Nichiren Shonin.

Posted on 5月 11th, 2025 by 三木 奎吾
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　中国大陸に並立した２国・元と宋という複雑微妙な国際情勢のなかで、新興の元から国書を送られて「こっちの陣営に付いて味方してくれるよな、な？」というような関係を迫られた日本。その政権は実権を「征夷」をタテマエとする武家が支配する国。そういう意味では幕末期に征夷大将軍として黒船を迎えた江戸幕府にも似た立ち位置に立たされていたと見ることもできるのかも知れない。
　鉄という農耕と軍事の最先端物資を半島からの輸入に頼っていた時代、日本国家社会は白村江という「世界戦争」の渦中に立ったことはあるけれど、その後は百済からの移住者を抱擁し鉄も自国生産できるようになってほぼ対外的な関係としては「交易」だけという通常運転で行ってきた。金属探査もそうした移住者によって進み、結果として奥州からの産金まで結果する奇跡にも恵まれる。
　その間、文化としての漢字や仏教思想の導入など、主に経済・文化的な関係性が基本だった。その流れは律令国家制度の導入にまで進んだけれど、それは日本の社会風土には必ずしも馴染まず、やがて各地域毎の「一所懸命」思想による武家支配体制が基本になっていった。
　政治体制としては、国内的な争乱の調整型権力として鎌倉幕府というのはあったのだろう。頼朝の領地大盤振る舞い政策に呼応した各地域支配目的の御家人たちは、幕府に対し自分に有利な支配地の差配をさせることが大目的で成立してきた。それは土地の支配権の再配分が基本であってそこに「国防」という認識はなかった。この基本線は江戸幕府においても同様だっただろう。であるのに託された権力名は「征夷」大将軍。
　一方、大陸国家では皇帝権力による「独裁」がながく続き、日本のような分権的社会とはその権力構造が違いすぎた。
　このような基本において今日の共産党独裁体制のかの国は基本的に変わっていないとも思える。鎌倉や江戸の幕府政権も分権的志向の強い政権であり、今日の議会制民主主義社会とも通底している。
　さてそういう状況下で国内調整型権力として、戦争大好きの独裁型権力・元と、衰退期にあるが交易を通じて関係も深めていた宋とを比べて見れば、宋に肩入れするようなスタンスを取ることは自然だったのだろう。幕府にして見るとこの元寇戦は二律背反ではあった。というのは対外戦では獲得できる領土は存在せず、その支配権を差配することが出来ない中で、征夷という「タテマエ」の有言実行を迫られた、という状況。これは政権担当者としてきわどい局面。
　そういう状況で最前線では鎌倉期御家人たちが、未曾有の新兵器で武装し「集団戦」を仕掛けてくる外敵に対して幕府に聞こえるように「大きく名乗りを上げて」立ち向かって行った。おい幕府、おれはこんなに勇敢に戦っているぜ！
　報われない可能性の高い「一所懸命」戦争。

English version⬇

The ‘otherworldly’ value warfare of international warfare, Yuan Enmity Museum-8
The Kamakura warriors were hard-working individuals who rushed forward with their personal conspicuous ‘bravery’ against the cutting-edge armaments of the war-loving armed dictatorship, the Yuan army. …

　In the complex and delicate international situation of the two parallel states on the Chinese mainland, Yuan and Song, Japan was sent a letter of state from the newly emerging Yuan, which said, ‘You will join our camp and take our side, won’t you?’ Japan was forced into a relationship with the Yuan. The regime was ruled by a warrior clan whose real power was based on the principle of ‘conquest of the barbarians’. In this sense, Japan could be seen as being in a similar position to the Edo Shogunate, which welcomed the Black Ships as a barbarian conqueror in the final days of the Tokugawa shogunate.
　In the period when Japan was dependent on imports from the peninsula for iron, the most advanced agricultural and military commodity, Japanese society was once in the middle of a ‘world war’ called the Baekchon River, but afterwards it embraced immigrants from Baekje and was able to produce its own iron, and has continued with normal operations, almost exclusively through ‘trade’, in its relations with the outside world. Metal exploration was also advanced by these immigrants, resulting in the miraculous discovery of gold from Oshu.
　During this period, the relationship was mainly based on economic and cultural relations, including the introduction of Chinese characters and Buddhist thought as a culture. This trend led to the introduction of the Ritsuryo state system, which was not always compatible with the Japanese social climate, and eventually became based on a system of samurai rule based on the idea of ‘issho’ in each region.
　As a political system, the Kamakura shogunate probably existed as a coordinating power for domestic disputes. In response to Yoritomo’s policy of territorial largesse, the local rulers established the Kamakura Shogunate with the main aim of having the Shogunate distribute the lands they controlled in their favour. This was based on the redistribution of control over land, and there was no recognition of ‘national defence’. This basic line was probably the same for the Edo Shogunate. The name of the power entrusted to the shogunate, however, was the ‘barbarian’ shogun.
　On the other hand, in continental states, the ‘dictatorship’ of the emperor continued for a long time, and the power structure was too different from that of a decentralised society like Japan.
　On this basis, today’s communist dictatorships seem fundamentally unchanged. The Kamakura and Edo shogunate regimes also had a strong decentralised orientation, which is also common to today’s parliamentary democratic societies.
　Under these circumstances, when comparing the war-loving dictatorial Yuan as a domestic coordinating power with the Song dynasty, which was in decline but was deepening its relations through trade, it was natural for the Shogunate to take a stance in favour of the Song dynasty. From the perspective of the Shogunate, this war against the Yuan Pirates was a contradiction in terms. The Shogunate had no territory to gain from foreign wars, and was unable to control it, but was forced to carry out its ‘policy’ of conquering the barbarians. This was a critical moment for those in charge of the administration.
　In such a situation, the Kamakura court nobles, on the frontline, armed with unprecedented new weapons, ‘announced themselves loudly’ so that the Shogunate would hear them and confront the foreign enemies who were launching a ‘mass war’. Hey Shogunate, I am fighting so bravely!
　A ‘hard’ war with a high chance of not being rewarded.

Posted on 5月 9th, 2025 by 三木 奎吾
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　さて一段落させて、ふたたび「元寇」シリーズ復帰。
　前後２回に及んだ元と高麗の軍船団による九州北部への侵攻。東アジア世界においては中国大陸が中華としていわば中枢の位置を占めているけれど、そこでの戦いはいかにも「大陸」的な陸上戦的な権力抗争であって、その周辺の国家社会にとってそうした国家は交易の対象であって、さまざまな文化的な往来交流が基調的な関係性ということになる。そのなかでも最大の「交易」国家として日本列島社会が存在してきた。海を挟んでの社会同士の関係としては、そうなるのが自然だろうし、事実日本社会は、大陸国家との関係で経済文化そして、政治制度などでも交易的にそれらを受け入れてきた。
　この元寇の時代は以前からの「日宋関係」という活発な交易が対「南宋」間で継続的に展開していた。日本側からは旧・奥州藤原氏の支配地域から産出する黄金が輸出されていた。日宋交易では日本側からは金・真珠・硫黄・木材などが輸出され、宋からは香料・錦・磁器・書籍などが輸入されていた。この鎌倉期には禅の人材や文化などの輸入が活発だった。多くの禅僧が渡海してきている。
　そのなかでも大陸国家にとっては金の魅力が絶大だったとされる。当時の金と銀の交換比率が日本では1:5なのに大陸国家では1:13という現実があった。「日本からは金が安く入手できる」というのが、最大の関心事だったことがわかりやすい。マルコポーロはこの時代人であり元の皇帝・フビライにも謁見しているが、その「黄金の国ジパング」の想像力は共有されていたと思われる。
　上の写真は元から日本側に送られた「国書」。最近の文書研究では元の皇帝が送った国書としては「前例のない鄭重さ」と解されている。国書冒頭に、日本国王に対して「奉る」とあり礼を尽くしている。さらに文末に「不宣」の文字があることが注目されている。これは「友人間」の定型句であってなお「臣下」としない意思を示した語句だと蒙古の文書「経世大典」に明記されているとのこと。
　また受け取った国書に対して、それを翻訳解釈したと考えられるのは当時の社会での「大学教授」＝禅宗高僧たちだろうが、かれらは「宋」から渡って来た人々であり、漢文の解釈に当たって元に対して否定的だった可能性が非常に高いと思われる。
　国書では「武力を使いたくはない」という表現もあったとされている。元の派遣軍・指揮官たちにはこうした「戦略」判断が大きなウェートを占めていたのではないか。そう考えてくると、第１波の文永の役で一定の打撃を与えたことで戦略的「役割」は終わったと考えた可能性が高い。多数の軍船団が狭い博多湾にビッシリと集結している中、荒天も予測されるような状況。早期に撤収という方針に決したと考えられる。文永の役での撤収に「神風」は無関係で意図的な撤収だったのだと思われる。

English version⬇

[Yuan’s ‘Statements of State’ and World Affairs Yuan Enemy History Museum – 6]
The latest research interprets this as unprecedented zhengjing as a world state. Even a friendly call. Yuan’s strategy at the time of the Wen-Yong War was a friendly attitude. Is kamikaze irrelevant? …

　Now that we’ve put a stop to this, we’re back to the “Genko” series.
　The invasion of northern Kyushu by the Yuan and Koryo fleets, which took place twice before and after the invasion. In the East Asian world, the Chinese continent occupies the central position as China, but the battles there were land-based power struggles in a ‘continental’ style, and for the surrounding states and societies, these states were objects of trade, and various cultural exchanges were the key relationship between them. The Japanese archipelagic societies have been the largest “trading” states among these. This is a natural relationship between societies across the sea, and Japanese society has, in fact, accepted trade in economic, cultural and political systems in relation to continental states.
　In the period of the Genko Incident, active trade between Japan and the Southern Song dynasty (960-1279) had been ongoing. From the Japanese side, gold produced from the former Oshu Fujiwara clan-controlled areas was exported. In the Japan-Song trade, gold, pearls, sulphur and timber were exported from the Japanese side, while perfumes, brocade, porcelain and books were imported from the Song. Imports of Zen personnel and culture were active during this Kamakura period. Many Zen monks travelled to the sea.
　Among these, it is said that gold was immensely attractive to the continental states. The exchange ratio of gold to silver at the time was 1:5 in Japan, but 1:13 in the continental countries. It is easy to see that the main concern was that ‘gold could be obtained cheaply from Japan.’ Marco Polo was a man of the period and had an audience with the Yuan emperor, Hubilai, whose imagination of the “golden land of Zipangu” seems to have been shared.
　The photo above shows the “Kokusho”, a letter of state sent from Yuan to the Japanese side. Recent research into the document has shown it to be ‘unprecedentedly Zheng-weight’ for a state letter sent by the Yuan emperors. The first sentence of the Kokusho states that it is ‘dedicated’ to the King of Japan, which is an act of courtesy. Furthermore, it is noted that at the end of the text there is the character ‘Fusen’. The Mongolian document “Keisei Dajiten” clearly states that this is a standard phrase for “between friends” and indicates the intention not to treat the person as a “vassal”.
　The people who are thought to have translated and interpreted the Kokusho are thought to have been the “university professors” of the society of the time, i.e. the high priests of the Zen sect, but they were from the Song dynasty, and it is highly likely that they were negative towards the Yuan when interpreting the Chinese text.
　In the Kokusho, it is said that they expressed that they did not want to use force. Such “strategic” judgements may have been of great importance to the Yuan’s dispatched forces and commanders. In this light, it is highly likely that they considered their strategic “role” to have ended with the first wave of the Bunyong War, which dealt a certain amount of blows. With a large number of military convoys tightly concentrated in the narrow Hakata Bay, and stormy weather predicted, the situation was such that they were likely to have decided on a policy of early withdrawal. It is thought that they decided on a policy of early withdrawal. It is thought that the “kamikaze” had nothing to do with the withdrawal from the Bun’ei no Yakuwari, and that it was a deliberate withdrawal.

Posted on 5月 7th, 2025 by 三木 奎吾
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　さてきのうまでは元の軍装備、その戦闘衣について考えて見た。これ自体は当時の日本に対してはるかに優位性をもった「戦略価値」の高いポイントだったと言える。こうした装備についての先進性に遭遇して、個人戦での勇猛さを絶対評価尺度としていた当時の日本側の軍事思想では太刀打ちできていなかったのだろうと推測できる。
　しかし、戦争は単に装備の先進性だけでは勝敗の帰趨は決しない。
　元軍は第１派の文永の役において10月20日の上陸地上戦では幕府・御家人軍に勝利して、博多の街を焼き払い、筥﨑の宮をも焼失させる「戦果」を得ている。通常の「征服戦争」であれば、こうした戦果を確保して、そこで征服地域の支配を確実化させるように動くだろう。それは支配＝政治体制の確立と言ったことがらの着手ということになる。
　しかし元軍は初戦に勝って橋頭堡を確保できたと思われるのに、軍勢は乗ってきた軍船団に帰還していたという。このことは、兵站という機能が十分に果たされていなかった可能性を示唆する。そしてこういう渡海してまで派遣した大遠征軍の「基本戦略」の不明、政治常識の不在を証明する。
　この大遠征軍の戦略的位置付けに、緻密な「兵站計画」が伴っていないことが明らか。戦争をするのに勝利後の計画がない。当たり前であれば、多くの犠牲を払って獲得した初戦の勝利からすぐに「陣地」を構築して、占領地の政治的支配の意思を露わにして行くのが当然だろう。しかしそこまでの戦略性・政治性が見られていない。
　元軍の海外派兵の類似例として、ジャワ島への侵攻がある。以下、Wikiの記述概要。
〜元軍のジャワ侵攻は1293年にジャワ島に侵攻した元軍が引き起こした。皇帝クビライが派遣した使者がジャワのシンガサリ王クルタナガラによって入墨をされて返されるという事件を切掛けとして始まったジャワ遠征。元軍がジャワ島に到着するまでに当地ジャワでは内戦的状況があって、当のクルタナガラ王はジャヤカトワン王によって弑逆されていた。元軍はクルタナガラ王の女婿・ウィジャヤの計略に誘導されジャヤカトワン王を討ったものの、その後ウィジャヤの裏切りにあってジャワ島からの敗退を余儀なくされた。全くの失敗に終わった遠征。しかし遠征失敗にもかかわらず、ジャワ遠征以後中国大陸とジャワ島の貿易交流は増大し東南アジア島嶼部歴史の大転換点の事件であった。〜
　この歴史事実を見ると、元軍には武力としての海外派兵はできてもその地の政権奪取ということはムリであり、その地域の政争のテコに利用されるのが関の山、ということが浮かび上がってくる。
　日本史研究ではこのジャワの事例との対比研究という目線が不足しているように思える。そのように見ていけば、文永の役での元軍の戦略性の乏しい動きも理解できるのではないだろうか？
　さて「神風」は吹いたのかどうか？　＜あした以降につづく＞

English version⬇

[Was there a “strategy” in Yuan’s overseas deployment? Genkou Historiography – 5]
1274, the Battle of Bun’ei 20 Oct. Unknown strategy to turn the army back to warships even though they had achieved great successes in the first battle. What about the invasion of Java by the same Yuan army? …

　Until yesterday, we looked at the original military equipment and its combat clothing. This in itself was a point of high “strategic value” with a far superiority over the Japanese of the time. It can be assumed that the Japanese military philosophy of the time, which used valour in individual battles as the absolute evaluation scale, was not able to compete with such advanced equipment.
　However, the outcome of a war is not determined simply by the advanced nature of equipment.
　In the first phase of the Bun’ei no Yakuwari, the Yuan forces defeated the Shogunate and the Gokenjin forces in a ground battle on 20 October, burning the city of Hakata and the Hakozaki Palace to the ground. In a normal “war of conquest”, the Shogunate would have secured such a result and moved there to secure control of the conquered area. This would be the start of establishing a political system of rule.
　However, while the Yuan forces were thought to have won the first battle and secured a bridgehead, they were returning to the military fleet they had boarded. This suggests that the function of logistics may not have been fully fulfilled. It also proves the lack of a ‘basic strategy’ and absence of political common sense as a large expeditionary force that was sent across the sea like this.
　It is clear that the strategic positioning of this great expeditionary force was not accompanied by a detailed “logistics plan”. There is no post-victory plan for waging war. If it were a matter of course, it would be natural to build “positions” immediately after the first victory, which was won at great cost, and go on to reveal the intention of political control of the occupied territories. However, we have not seen that much strategising and politicking.
　A similar example of ex-military deployment abroad is the invasion of Java. The following is a summary of the Wiki description.
〜˜The Yuan invasion of Java was caused by Yuan troops invading the island of Java in 1293. The Javanese expedition began with an incident in which an envoy sent by Emperor Kubilai was inked and returned by the Javanese king Singhasari Kultanagara. By the time the Yuan army arrived in Java, there was a civil war situation in Java and King Krutanagara had been murdered by King Jayakatwan. The Yuan army was led by Wijaya, the son-in-law of King Kirtanagara, to defeat King Jayakatwan, but was then betrayed by Wijaya and forced to retreat from Java. The expedition was an utter failure. However, despite the failure of the expedition, trade exchanges between the Chinese mainland and Java increased after the Java expedition, and it was an incident that marked a major turning point in the history of the islands of South East Asia. 〜
This historical fact shows that, although the Yuan army could deploy overseas as an armed force, it was unable to seize power in the region and could only be used as a lever in political disputes in the region.
　Japanese historical research seems to lack the perspective of contrasting this with the case of Java. If we look at it in this way, we can understand the poor strategic moves of the Yuan army in the Bun’ei no Yakuza.
　So, did the “kamikaze” blow or not?　＜To be continued from tomorrow.

Posted on 5月 5th, 2025 by 三木 奎吾
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　今回「作家と住空間」という電子書籍を出版して以降、昔人の考えたこと、やってきたことへの思いが強くなってきます。芥川龍之介とか、司馬遼太郎などの作品と住空間に触れることで、その「場所で」かれらはどんな心象に至っていたのか、という想像力に加速度が付いてくる。人生時間に能動的に関われる期間内に、そういう過去の人びととの対話を心がけたい。「高齢期」の生き甲斐としてそのことに集中したい。一般的には「歴史数寄」ということになる。
　元寇っていう大きな歴史事実について、もうちょっと深い事実を探査してみたくなった心理的起点。よく「神風なんて国粋主義的な刷り込みに過ぎない」という考えから元寇という歴史事実そのものの発掘をスルーさせるような「圧」がありますが、なんかおかしい。この元寇史料館もその存在自体がまったく知られていない。そもそも管理運営すら公共ではなく、公共から日蓮の開いた宗派寺院に「委託」されているようなのだ。受付窓口は僧侶の方。そろそろ平明に事実の解明・一般化に向かうべきではないか？
　上の図は、展示資料の断片的図柄からPhotoshopで復元再生させたデータ。この資料に寄れば元寇第１波での彼我の兵力は敵勢40,000に対し、九州の御家人たちの動員兵力が10,000程度になっている。
　博多の町衆・市民たちは当然さまざまに日本軍に協力しただろうから、そういう総体としての防衛勢力は元軍に対して必ずしも劣勢だったとは思えないが、純軍事勢力では格差があった。結果として1274年10月20日の戦闘においては、数において圧倒的優勢な元軍の跳梁跋扈を許してしまう。薩摩の島津や豊後の大友などの日本側は敗退を繰り返した。きのう見たようにそもそも軍装において大きな技術格差まで存在した。その上、弓矢の弾道距離も２倍程度の格差であり、さらに矢には毒が塗ってあったので損害は甚大だった。「てつはう」といわれる火薬兵器もその威圧力で圧倒されたという。
　しかし元軍の「士気」はどの程度だったかは不明。そもそも海軍的な戦争は元としてもはじめての経験。というか海軍をいくら大人数で派遣しても、その地域に根ざす勢力の裏切り協力などが得られなければ、食糧物資の確保など非常に困難だったことだろう。日本国内の内戦でも木曽義仲の失敗などを見れば、あきらかだと思う。強盗のように物資を現地で巻き上げるというのでは民心を把握することは到底ムリ。そういう教訓に踏まえ信長は、初上洛時、軍の非道行為を厳禁し、違反者は発見時に即座に死刑に処している。
　その程度のことを元軍が理解していないハズはない。かれらは軍事作戦的には圧倒して博多の街を炎上潰滅させたが焼いてしまっては略奪も不可能。その後全軍が海上の軍船に帰還していたという。＜以下、あした以降に＞

English version⬇

The first wave of the battle of Bun’ei no Yakuwari, at the Museum of Genko History – 3]
On 20 October 1274, the Yuan forces landed in Hakata, overwhelmed the armies of the Imperialists in Kyushu, and set the city of Hakata ablaze. But was naval “conquest” essentially possible? …

Since the publication of the e-book “Writers and Living Space”, my thoughts about what people thought and did in the past have grown stronger. By coming into contact with the works and living spaces of Ryunosuke Akutagawa, Ryotaro Shiba and others, my imagination about what kind of mental images they had in those “places” has been accelerated. I would like to try to have a dialogue with these people of the past during the period when I can actively engage in the time of my life. I want to concentrate on this as the purpose of living in my “old age”. Generally speaking, this is called “historical pondering”.
　This is the psychological starting point of my desire to explore more in-depth facts about the great historical fact of the Genko. There is often a “pressure” to let people go through the excavation of the historical fact of the Genko, based on the idea that “kamikaze is just a nationalistic imprinting”, which is something strange. The existence of this museum itself is not known at all. In the first place, even the management and operation of the museum is not public, but seems to have been “entrusted” by the public to a sectarian temple founded by Nichiren Shoshu. The reception desk is staffed by priests. Isn’t it time to start clarifying and generalising the facts in plain sight?
　The figure above is data reconstructed and reproduced by Photoshop from fragmentary patterns in the exhibition material. According to this data, the number of troops mobilised by the Imperialists in Kyushu in the first wave of the Genko was around 10,000 compared to 40,000 by the enemy.
　The townspeople and citizens of Hakata would naturally have cooperated with the Japanese in various ways, so it does not seem that the defence force as a whole was necessarily inferior to the Yuan forces, but there was a disparity in terms of pure military strength. As a result, in the battle of 20 October 1274, they allowed the Yuan forces, which had an overwhelming superiority in numbers, to ransack the city. The Japanese side, including Shimazu of Satsuma and Otomo of Bungo, were repeatedly defeated. As we saw yesterday, there was even a large technology gap in military equipment. In addition, the ballistic range of their bows and arrows was about twice as great, and the arrows were coated with poison, so the damage was enormous. The explosive weapons known as “tetsu-hau” were also said to have been overwhelmed by their overpowering power.
　However, the extent of the “morale” of the Yuan forces is unknown. In the first place, this was the first experience of naval warfare for the Yuan. In fact, no matter how large a navy was dispatched, it would have been extremely difficult to secure food supplies without the treacherous cooperation of forces rooted in the area. The failure of Kiso Yoshinaka in the Japanese Civil War is a clear example of this. It would have been impossible to grasp the people’s mindset if they were to collect supplies on the spot, like robbers. Based on this lesson, Nobunaga strictly forbade any atrocities committed by his troops when they first arrived in Kyoto, and immediately executed those who violated the law on discovery.
　There is no reason to believe that the Yuan forces did not understand this. They overwhelmed the city of Hakata in terms of military operations and destroyed it in flames, but looting was impossible once the city was burnt to the ground. Afterwards, the entire army returned to their warships at sea. <

Posted on 5月 3rd, 2025 by 三木 奎吾
Filed under: 歴史探訪 | No Comments »